We investigate the link between compensation and risk-taking among finance firms during the period of 1992-2008. First, there are substantial cross-firm differences in total executive compensation residualized for firm size. Second, residual pay is correlated with price-based risk-taking measures including firm beta, return volatility, the sensitivity of firm stock price to the ABX subprime index, and tail cumulative return performance. Third, these risk-taking measures are correlated with residual pay even though executives are highly incentivized as measured by insider ownership. Finally, compensation and risk-taking are not related to governance variables but covary with ownership by institutional investors who tend to have short-termist preferences and the power to influence firm management policies. Our findings suggest that our residual pay measure is picking up other important high-powered incentives not captured by insider ownership. They also point to substantial heterogeneity in both firm culture and investor preferences for short-termism and risk-taking.
I. Introduction
Are Wall Street bonuses to blame for the most significant economic crisis since the Great Depression? Many including the Obama administration seem to think so. In his testimony (June 6, 2009 ) in front of Congress on the Treasury budget, Secretary Geithner argues, "I think that although many things caused this crisis, what happened to compensation and the incentives in creative risk taking did contribute in some institutions to the vulnerability that we saw in this financial crisis." (emphasis added).
1 To address this issue, the Obama administration is promoting reforms to tie pay to long-term performance and increase the say of shareholders in approving compensation and electing directors on compensation committees. Implicit in these reforms is the view that finance firms' short-termist incentives reflect mis-governance or entrenchment and a misalignment with shareholder interest.
This creative risk-taking is perhaps best epitomized by the now infamous "musical chairs" quote of Chuck Prince, then CEO of Citigroup, regarding their exposures to the subprime mortgage market. In his interview with the Financial Times back in July 2007, Chuck Prince, in referring to his company not backing away from risks at the beginning of the subprime crisis, remarked: "When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing." This quote is often attributed as market pressure (presumably being fired by impatient shareholders) forcing Citi's managers to take on such risks, whether or not they fully understood them. In other words, the short-termism emanated not so much from mis-governance or entrenchment as from demand on the part of investors themselves. This more nuanced perspective of a short-term stock market forcing management to be excessively myopic also has basis in theory (see Stein 1989 and Stein 2003 for a review of this large literature on the contrasting perspectives of the source of short-termism in markets).
In this paper, we motivate our empirical analysis around a few hypotheses drawn from this shorttermism and risk-taking literature. The first is the familiar view of mis-governance and entrenchment.
The second, due to Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) , draws a parallel between banks like Bear Stearns to dot-com stocks and growth options. In this "quant-bubble" story, over-confident and optimistic investors incentivize otherwise long-run value maximizing managers to make investments and take risks in subprime derivatives built from financial engineering. The rationale is that the company can experience short-run earnings growth as a result and be quickly resold to even more optimistic investors. The third is the "cowboy culture" story in which Bear Stearns has risk-taking in its genes and shareholders who like such firms select to be their shareholders. While related, these three hypotheses yield somewhat different predictions, which we exploit below.
Using panel data on financial firm executive compensation and risk-taking from 1992-2008, we ask whether cross-sectional variation in firm compensation practices is related to heterogeneity in subsequent risk-taking. Our measure of short-termism is the residual of total annual firm compensation (payouts to top executives) controlling for firm size and finance sub-industry classifications. Our measure differs from the more traditional measure of incentives---namely, insider ownership. Indeed, recent work (notably Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009) finds that insider ownership does not have much predictive power for risk-taking and that executives of finance firms tend to have high values of ownership stakes to begin with. But as we discuss below, our residual compensation measure better picks up implicit incentives not captured by insider ownership and as a result has more explanatory power for risk-taking.
Our empirical design is as follows. We split our sample into two periods-an early period defined as 1992 (when we start having executive compensation data) up to 2000, which marks the end of the dot-com era, and a late period from 2001-2008 which marks the beginning and end of the housing boom. We then take the first three years 1992-1994 to create a ranking of executive compensation among firms at the beginning of the early period. Specifically, we take the log of average executive compensation from 1992-1994 and regress this on the log of a firm's market capitalization in 1994, allowing for heterogeneity at the sub-industry level, to come up with a residual compensation ranking for each firm. We then take data from 1998-2000 to create a similar ranking for residual compensation before the late period.
Then, using data from 1995-2000 and 2001-2008 , we calculate various risk-taking measures for the early and late periods, respectively. The first set consists of price-based measures including firm beta and return volatility. For the late period, we also compute the sensitivity of a firm's stock price to the ABX subprime index. The second set consists of accounting-based measures including the average holdings of mortgage-backed securities not backed by one of the government-sponsored entities (GSEs) and book leverage. We also examine the cumulative return performance of our firms in each period with the idea of relating tail performance to compensation. Our baseline analysis is to regress these risk-taking measures on our lagged residual CEO compensation (from 1992 CEO compensation (from -1994 We work with this stark set-up rather than panel estimation for a few reasons. The split in the sample periods is admittedly ad-hoc and indeed even in the late nineties, banks also faced turmoil related to the Asian crisis, though the magnitudes of their problems are dwarfed by the recent crisis. But as we will show, residual pay in our two cross-sections is highly correlated, so we are essentially capturing permanent effects. This set-up makes it clear that residual pay in our cross-sections is very similar and allows for a simple and conservative framework to measure our effects. Moreover, we will also work with a pooled panel set-up and cluster standard errors by firm in the robustness section and the results are similar. In addition, this set-up best captures cumulative returns over long horizons, which really gets at the idea behind the title of the paper. Sachs, Wells Fargo, and Berkshire Hathaway. As such, we interpret heterogeneity of our residual compensation measure as being due to permanent cross-firm differences.
Second, we find that our residual compensation measure is strongly correlated in both subsamples with our price-based measures of subsequent risk-taking. Firms with high executive compensation have a higher CAPM beta, higher return volatility, and ABX exposure. For instance, a one-standard deviation increase in residual compensation is associated with a 0.40-standard deviation increase in subsequent stock price exposure to price movements in the ABX. A price-based risk score, defined as the average of the normalized z-scores of CAPM beta, return volatility and ABX exposure, is even more strongly related to residual compensation than any of the measures individually, suggesting there is a lot of measurement error in the risk measures to begin with. Moreover, firms with high residual compensation are more likely to be in the tails of performance, with extremely good performance in the early period when the market did well and extremely poor performance in the late period when the market did poorly.
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For example, a one-standard deviation increase in residual compensation in 1998-2000 is associated with 24% lower returns over the market in the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] period. These results stand in contrast to more traditional book based measures of risk-taking, which do less well. This is perhaps not surprising since many of the finance firms' exposures during the recent crisis were off balance sheet.
These findings suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in financial firms in which highcompensation, high risk-taking and tail performance go hand in hand. As a result, the aggressive firms that were yesterday's heroes when the stock market did well can easily be today's outcasts when fortunes reverse, very much to the point of what we have experienced in the last twenty or so years. The important thing to note here is that our price risk score measure is robust and statistically significant across all sub-industries. Moreover, the correlation between the risk-taking measures and residual compensation is primarily a compositional effect in that changes in the risk-taking measures are uncorrelated with changes in the residual compensation measure. Additionally, we examine components of pay and find that both bonuses and equity/option compensation are correlated with risk-taking (while salary is markedly less informative). We also perform a series of additional checks to verify the robustness of our findings.
We next examine the hypothesis of short-term compensation directly by regressing risk-taking of firms on compensation while controlling for insider ownership on the presumption that insider ownership is a proxy for long-term incentives. If indeed compensation is capturing long-term pay incentives (as opposed to short-term pay), then having insider ownership should mute our results and we should also expect insider ownership to predict risk-taking with the same sign as compensation. Instead, our baseline findings on compensation remain even after controlling for insider ownership.
We then ask whether our results are due to mis-governance or entrenchment as opposed to heterogeneity among investors who want to invest in high risk-taking firms and hence need to set compensation appropriately to induce such behavior. We find that standard governance measures such as the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) measures of entrenchment, as well as board independence, are not correlated with our results (if anything, the worst governance score firms are associated with less risk-taking). So it appears that there is no evidence of mis-governance using these standard metrics for mis-alignment of interest between shareholders and management, at least in the cross-section. But this may simply be that these measures are not very good measures of governance in finance.
In contrast, we find that residual compensation and risk-taking are positively correlated with stock turnover and institutional ownership, consistent with the quant-bubble and cowboy culture alternatives. Here, there is heterogeneity in investor preferences with institutional investors (who tend to trade more and perhaps with shorter-horizons because of agency issues) wanting certain firms to take more risks and hence having to give them short-term incentives to do so. Indeed, both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that institutional investors are the ones with the power to pressure management (Froot, Perold and Stein (1992) , Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005, Parrino, Sias and Starks 2003) . In this interpretation, the high-powered incentives picked up by our residual pay measure are simply the carrot needed to get the firm to take risks desired by institutional investors. Of course, one has to be a bit careful in interpretations here since if institutional investors are too short-termist and say always flip the shares of the company, they will not have any influence over management. But in practice, there is plentiful evidence that institutional investors care greatly about companies making quarterly earnings targets, presumably because the accompanying growth in share prices helps the institutional investors' portfolio performance.
Finally, we attempt to distinguish between the quant-bubble and cowboy culture alternatives, which are very similar in spirit. The quant-bubble story predicts that Bear Stearns with high residual compensation is like a dot-com stock and hence should have high valuations as say measured by marketto-book. But it turns out that our residual compensation variable's explanatory power for risk-taking is unaffected by market-to-book as a control variable, which is inconsistent with the quant-bubble story.
The only proviso is that standard metrics of like market-to-book are typically poor measures of finance firm valuations.
In sum, our findings suggest that certain firms have more of a culture of high-powered incentives and risk-taking and that investors with heterogeneous preferences invest into these different firms.
While we have focused on total direct compensation, which is easier to measure than firing pressure, it is likely that firing for failure to meet quarterly targets (while more difficult to measure) is a more powerful motivator. 3 These two types of high-powered incentives are likely to be correlated across firms and may explain why short-term pay predicts risk-taking even though very rich executives had such large stakes in their companies. In point, the competitive pressure that Chuck Prince suggests in his musical chairs quote is likely due to firing as much as bonuses.
Our paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section II and the data in Section III. We present the results in Section IV and conclude with some thoughts on future research in Section V.
II. Related Literature
The literature on compensation, governance and risk-taking has, up until very recently, paid very little attention to the financial sector. There are some exceptions. For instance, Laeven and Levine (2008) document that risk taking among banks is higher in those with large and diversified blockholders. Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) argue that stock option grants lead CEOs to take less borrowing and higher capital ratios but to undertake riskier investments.
The crisis has spurred research contemporary with ours into this previously under-researched area. Adams (2009) focuses on comparing governance at financial firms prominent in the crisis with non-financials and concludes that, although there are substantial differences in average governance between the two groups, governance is not an obvious culprit for the crisis. Erkens, Hung and Matos (2009) look at international evidence on governance, CEO turnover and risk-taking for the [2006] [2007] [2008] crisis period and find that stronger governance mechanisms are associated with more CEO turnover but also more losses and bonuses are associated with ex post shareholder losses and higher book leverage.
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2009) look at CEO and risk-manager compensation and find that firms with higher risk-manager compensation originated lower-quality loans. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) find that insider ownership does not have much explanatory power for which finance firms did badly in terms of returns during the crisis.
Our contribution is to come up with our residual pay measure that can pick up other important incentives better than the traditional measure of insider ownership. First, top executives, even if they have high ownership stakes, face other high-powered incentives related to market pressure from shorttermist investors to out-perform rivals. The above quote from Chuck Prince and the recent firing of John Mack of Morgan Stanley after the collapse of Lehman (both of whom were well-incentivized and both facing pressure from impatient shareholders) are consistent with this perspective. In other words, implicit incentives related to firing also matter greatly. Second, many rank-and-file employees that matter for risk-taking (such as risk managers or proprietary traders) do not typically have high ownership stakes and hence our measure might better pick up the incentives of these employees. We would ideally like compensation data for a wide range of employees at each firm, but ExecuComp (our data source for compensation) typically only provides data for the top five executives. Nonetheless, higher annual payouts at the top level might pick up a firm culture for high-powered incentives, whether they are bonuses or higher sensitivity of firing to short-term performance. As such, we view our residual pay measure as being a sensible proxy of both firm-wide explicit and implicit short-termist incentives.
Relative to this literature, we contribute a number of new findings. First, we are the first to focus on price-based risk-taking measures rather than standard book leverage measures. Indeed, we find that out price-based measures show up much more significantly in our regressions than do book leverage.
Second, we focus on risk-taking over long periods and establish that the relationship between risk-taking and compensation is a persistent practice over a long time period. In particular, we not only find that aggressive firms who did well in the 1990's and were "yesterday's heroes" were the largest risk-takers and are today's outcasts in the crisis, but we also find that these firms tend to be the high compensation firms, and that the compensation practices at these firms tend to be persistently high even after excluding the CEO. Here it is important to emphasize that just focusing on the crisis period would be inadequate to nail down a fixed effects hypothesis or the tail return risk measure. Our results thus contribute to the growing idea that risk-taking may be related to a firm-fixed effect such as firm culture that is picked up by our compensation measure. Third, we find that both bonuses and options/equity compensation drive risk-taking in contrast to insider ownership (which we find similar to Fahlenbrach and Stulz has limited explanatory power). In other words, it appears that it is the shorter-term incentives in the organization that matters. Fourth, we further expand the link between short-term compensation and risk-taking by studying whether short-termism among investors is an alternative explanation to misgovernance and find that the evidence favors a clientele effect among investors.
These findings contribute to the broader literature on governance and executive compensation by focusing on financial firms, where these issues are now recognized as especially important due to the systemic risk the sector poses to the economy, and by offering empirical evidence that speculative activity influences compensation and short-term risk-taking. A large literature already focuses on whether value and risk-taking are related to shareholder rights and managerial rent-extraction (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2002 , Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2009 , Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003 , Yermack 1996 , among many). Additionally, we also contribute to the literature on compensation and performance (e.g., Cooper, Gulen and Rau 2009, Kaplan 2008) and particular components of compensation such as bonuses contribute to short-termism (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon 2006 , Healy 1985 , Burns and Kedia 2006 , Murphy 1999 .
III. Data and Definitions

A. Classifying Financial Firms
We start with the CRSP Monthly Stock File, 1992-2008. We limit our analysis to financial firms, which we divide into three groups. We first construct a group of primary dealers by hand- Mac, and Sallie Mae from our analysis.
We then link the CRSP monthly returns of these financial firms to their accounting data using the CRSP-COMPUSTAT Quarterly file. Then we link this merged database with ExecuComp database to retrieve their executive compensation data. Our baseline sample of financial firms has to have data from all three of these databases.
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B. Variables
The construction of our variables is as follows. We compute our residual compensation measure as follows. We first average total compensation (including bonus, salary, equity and option grants, and other direct annual compensation) across the top five most highly paid executives at each firm. We aggregate across all forms of direct compensation because it is a less noisy measure of short-term pay practices than looking at particular components. Indeed, some authors such as Michael Jensen argue that option grants are just a cost-efficient way to pay bonuses and a large literature (Murphy 2000, Hall and Murphy 2003) convincingly shows that both bonus and option grants motivate short-termist behavior.
Then we regress (cross-sectionally) total compensation on two control variables. The first is firm size since it is well known that the best personnel work for the biggest firms (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Murphy 1999 We compute six measures of risk-taking and stock-price performance: 1) the beta of the firm's stock, 2) the firm's stock return volatility, 3) the correlation of a firm's daily stock returns with returns to the ABX AAA index (ABX Exposure), 4) the cumulative return to the firm's stock, 5) a firm's balance sheet holdings of non-agency mortgage backed securities (MBS Exposure), and 6) book leverage. We follow Adrian and Shin (2009) who analyze the leverage characteristics of investment banks by computing leverage as the ratio of book assets (ATQ) to book equity (SEQQ).
We compute a firm's Market Beta and Return Volatility for a given period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) We use the on-the-run ABX daily price index obtained from Barclays Capital Live 7 to compute a firm's ABX Exposure. Following Longstaff (2010), we compute the ABX return as the log of the time-t price divided by the time t-1 price, where we ignore the coupon rates of each tranche (i.e. like Longstaff, we are assuming a coupon yield of zero). We compute a firm's exposure to the AAA tranche by regressing returns obtained from the CRSP Daily Returns File on returns to the ABX AAA and returns to the market (defined as the CRSP Value-Weighted Index return, including dividends) for each firm from 2006 (when the ABX was created) through the end of 2008. We take the coefficient on ABX returns as the firm's exposure to the ABX. Importantly, we also compute an average price-based risk score measure that is an equal-weighted average of the standardized z-scores of market beta, return volatility and, in the late period, the firm's exposure to ABX. As we will show below, the risk measures are noisy and hence averaging them provides a cleaner measure of firm risk-taking. This price-based risk score is our main dependent variable of interest.
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We obtain data on exposure to mortgage-backed securities ( . We focus on non-GSE guaranteed mortgage-backed securities in order to focus attention on the riskiest securities such as subprime. We also create an analogous book based risk score measure that is the average of the standardized z-scores of Exposure to MBS and Book Leverage.
Our baseline computations relate total compensation to risk-taking. In extended results, we will also utilize insider ownership, which we measure as the number of shares plus the delta-weighted number of options owned by the top five executives divided by shares outstanding, as a noisy proxy for long-term compensation. 9 We compute the delta-weights on the options using the Core and Guay (1999) methodology.
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We also relate these measures of risk-taking and stock price performance to measures of governance. We obtain from RiskMetrics data on corporate governance including the G index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003) , percentage of directors that are outsiders (classified as "Independent" by RiskMetrics), and the board size. Since the RiskMetrics data on directors goes back to 1997, we have data on board size and independence only for our late period. We obtain data on the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2009 ) from Lucian Bebchuk's website. For our measure of speculative activity, we use monthly stock turnover data from CRSP and compute the average 36-month stock turnover (VOL*100 / SHROUT*1000) for each period.
We obtain data on institutional ownership from the Thomson Reuters S34 database, which captures 13F filings by financial institutions electronically. We match 8-digit CUSIPs in Thomson to
PERMNOs in CRSP, noting that the CUSIPs in Thomson are provided for the filing date (not the reporting date). For each PERMNO, we divide the shares held by each financial institution (SHARES)
by the shares outstanding (as reported by Thomson in SHROUT1 before 1999 and SHROUT2 after 1999) and sum up over each stock. We take care to ensure that holdings and shares outstanding both reflect stock splits when necessary. 11 We censor the percentage of shares held by institutions at 1 for a few observations.
Lastly, we winsorize all variables except for our compensation variables and Market
Capitalization at their 1% and 99% values. We do not winsorize the G Index, E Index, board size or the percentage of directors that are outsiders, since these are based on well-behaved count-data.
IV. Results
Our goal is to relate differences in risk-taking across finance firms to cross-sectional heterogeneity in their compensation. To this end, we split our sample into two periods-an early period defined as 1992 (when we start having reasonable executive compensation data) up to 2000, which marks the end of the dot-com era and a late from 2001-2008 which marks the beginning and end of the housing boom. We then take 1992-1994 (1998-2000) to create a ranking of executive compensation among firms at the beginning of the early period. 12 As we mentioned earlier, in our comparison of firm compensation practices, it is important to control for two things. The first is firm size since it is well known that better personnel work for bigger firms (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Murphy 1999 ). The second is heterogeneity in sub-industry classifications among financial firms (described above). In other words, we work with a residual compensation measure in which we take the residual from a crosssectional regression of compensation on firm size and sub-industry classifications.
Ideally, we would like to control for heterogeneity by allowing both slopes and intercepts to vary across sub-industries. Unfortunately, the limited number of primary dealers per year does not allow us to form reliable estimates of the slope and intercept within that group. 13 Instead, we take the log of average executive compensation in 1992-1994 (1998-2000 for the crisis-period) and regress it on the log of firms' market capitalization in 1994 (2000 for the crisis-period), allowing intercepts to vary by subindustry and allowing the insurers group to have a slope distinct from banks and primary dealers. 14 This specification allows for heterogeneity in the levels of pay across sub-industries and for an insurerspecific slope (where we have enough observations to form a reliable estimate).
With these residual pay estimates in hand, we track the risk-taking of these firms from 1995-2000 and 2001-2008, respectively . Specifically, using data from 1995-2000, we calculate various risktaking measures including firm beta, return volatility, average holdings of non-GSE backed mortgagebacked securities, and average book leverage. We also form a price-based risk score based on equalweighted z-scores of firm beta and return volatility and a book-based risk score based on holdings of non-GSE backed mortgage-backed securities and book leverage. We then regress these risk-taking measures on our lagged residual CEO compensation (from 1992-1994) measure along with other firm characteristics. We also regress the cumulative return performance of each firm on lagged residual compensation to look at which firms have extreme performance. Similarly, we calculate risk-taking measures and return outcomes for the period of 2001-2008 and regress these on our residual
12 If a firm reports compensation for less than the full three years inside the ranking window, we take the average of the available data. Note that we are averaging (over time) top 5 executive compensation, which is itself an average. We employ this procedure because there is noise in ExecuComp. For example, if a CEO serves less than a full year, pay will be smaller for that year. Additionally, ExecuComp sometimes fails to report data on all top five executives as reported in their proxy statement, and taking the three-year average smoothes this. 13 In particular, the estimate of the slope of compensation and market capitalization fluctuates depending on the year in which the regression is run due to changes in the composition of the primary dealer group. Consistent with this, running a regression that allows for slopes and intercepts to vary across all sub-industries yields a large standard error on the slope for primary dealers. 14 We have also regressed the average compensation on not just 1994 log market capitalization but the average of the market capitalizations from 1992-1994 and obtain similar results.
compensation measures constructed from 1998-2000. During the late period, we can also compute the sensitivity of a firm's stock price to the ABX subprime index and include this in the price-based risk score.
Our final data set comprises two cross-sections: the first containing data on pay of 153 firms ( Mean (median) firm market capitalization was $2.79B ($1.18B) with a standard deviation of $4.27B in 1994, and was $13.0B ($3.03B) with a standard deviation of $31.0B in 2000. Our sample encompasses a broad-cross-section of finance. It includes the top investment banks, commercial banks, and insurers in both the early and late periods (Bear Stearns, Citigroup/Travelers, AIG, etc.), as well as smaller firms.
A. Heterogeneity in Compensation Practices
We first document that there is substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in executive compensation controlling for firm size and finance sub-industry classifications. The formal regression results are presented in Panel A of Table 2 . The first column shows the results for the early period and the second shows the results for the late period. Notice in the early period that the coefficient in front of Log Market Capitalization is positive (0.47) and very statistically significant. The coefficient in front of the insurer specific slope is -0.31 and also significant, indicating that insurer pay increases less quickly with firm size then for primary dealers and banks. The average level of pay also differs somewhat across these three groups, with primary dealers having the highest pay on average. The relationship is economically significant with an R-square above 0.6. The results for the late period in the second column are qualitatively similar. Table 2 . Each panel plots the log of average total compensation among executives in each ranking period against log market capitalization, and highlights the relationship for our three groups. For example, Panel A plots, for the early period, the log of executive compensation during [1992] [1993] [1994] against market capitalization at the end of 1994, with three lines representing the linear fit of size to compensation for our three sub-industries. A quick eyeball of the figure suggests that there is indeed a strong linear relationship between log total compensation and log market capitalization, with primary dealers having a higher-than-average level of pay relative to banks and insurers and insurers having a lower pay-size slope compared to primary dealers and banks. Panel B of Figure 2 plots the results for the late period. Notice that the two figures are fairly similar. This is not a coincidence as the residual pays from these two periods are quite correlated, as we show below.
Panel B of Table 2 gives summary statistics for log compensation and log market capitalization by sub-industry and period. Together with the regression results from Panel A of Table 2, Given our small sample size and the fact that we have statistical significance, it is not surprising that the implied economic significance from our regression in Panel A of Table 2 is quite large. More interestingly, the residual compensation measures obtained from this regression are highly correlated across the two sub-samples, as shown in Panel C. The correlation between residual compensation in the two periods is 0.69 with a p-value of zero. Table 3 lists quintile rankings of residual executive compensation (ranked within each subindustry) for firms prominent in the financial crisis. High residual compensation firms include Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide, and AIG, and they tend to be high residual compensation firms even as far back as the 1992-1994 ranking period. We emphasize this point because we believe this suggests our residual compensation measure is a noisy proxy for firm-specific compensation practices.
To analyze this point further, we examine whether CEO turnover and stock price performance drive changes in the residual compensation measures. The idea is that if these variables do not drive changes in residual compensation then it is suggestive of something more fundamental about the culture or technology of the firm. Panel A of Table 4 Panel C repeats this exercise for raw residual compensation (not quintile rankings) and finds that the coefficient on early period compensation is 0.84; returns and CEO turnover are both statistically insignificant and provide almost no additional R-squared. We conclude that CEO turnover and stock price performance have weak explanatory power for changes in rankings and that the bulk of explanatory power is provided by past rankings. The economic significance of stock price performance and CEO turnover in the interim are negligible. We note finally that a Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test of serial correlation in the residual compensation between the two periods rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation with a p-value of zero. 16 As such, we interpret our residual compensation measure as being largely a firm fixed-effect and that there is a substantial cross-sectional variation in this residual compensation measure.
Finally, because we are concerned that sample attrition between our early and late ranking periods may be driving our results, we examine whether there are systematic differences between the 73 firms who are not present in both 1992-1994 and 1998-2000 samples and the 79 that are present in both.
First, we examine whether persistence among firms that are present in 1992-1994 and 1995-1997 but not in 1998-2000 (there are 33 such firms) is different than persistence for firms that survive through 2000.
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We regress 1995-1997 residual compensation as the dependent variable on 1992-1994 residual compensation and include an interaction with an indicator for whether a firm subsequently drops out.
We find no statistical evidence that persistence for dropouts is different than persistence for survivors: in fact, the point estimate on 1992-1994 residual compensation is even higher for the 33 firms who subsequently drop out than for those that survive, although the difference is not statistically significant.
Second, we look at CRSP delisting codes for these firms that do not survive and find that mergers account for many of the firms that drop out. Since targets are typically smaller firms, we examine whether there is a size bias in our results by dropping the bottom 25% of firms by market capitalization in both the 1992-1994 and 1998-2000 samples and repeating our analysis. We find that our estimates of persistence are if anything higher and our results on risk-taking below are virtually unchanged. We conclude that attrition between the two samples is not driving our persistence results.
B. Compensation and Risk-Taking
We now analyze the relationship between our residual compensation measure and risk-taking and find that residual compensation and subsequent risk-taking are strongly correlated in both subsamples. We start with our price-based measures. Our first set of findings is that firms with high executive compensation have a higher CAPM beta, higher return volatility and higher ABX exposure. Figure 2 demonstrate the results of predictive regressions where we compute beta, volatility and ABX exposure and regress this on residual compensation in 1992-1994 (1998-2000) . The formal regressions are in Table 5 , Panel A. We start our discussion with market beta (see Figure 2 Since a portion of financial firms' exposure to the subprime market operated through off-balance sheet vehicles, we next consider our ABX exposure measure, which is market-based and should more sharply capture the large risks that banks took than balance-sheet measures (see Figure 2 (e)). Offloading risky assets into structured investment vehicles (SIVs), which finance the purchase of these assets using short-term paper, did not off-load the risk from the sponsoring firms themselves.
Sponsoring firms often retained risk by granting "liquidity backstops" or credit lines to these vehicles, to be drawn in case these SIV's could not continue to finance themselves in the market. This is exactly what happened, bringing enormous losses to the sponsoring firms (Brunnermeier 2009 ). Compensation also picks out a number of other firms who had high exposure to subprime -Hartford Financial (HIG), an insurer who received $3.4 billion in TARP money, is a high compensation firm, as is Fremont General (FMT).
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We also consider an average price risk score measure which puts equal weight on the standardized versions of market beta, return volatility and (when available) ABX exposure (see Figure   18 Fremont General was a relatively small California bank that nevertheless managed to originate a significant volume of subprime mortgages nationally and did not stop doing so until faced with a likely cease and desist order from the FDIC in 2007. Afterwards, Fremont General became embroiled in lawsuits alleging predatory lending.
(f)-(g)). Here, we actually find that our results are even stronger when we use this average price risk 19 We will focus on this measure in the remaining paper.
We next consider how the cumulative returns of these firms are related to their compensation practices. The idea is that high residual compensation firms are more likely to be in the tails of performance, with extreme good performance pre-crisis when the market did well and extreme poor performance during the crisis period when the market did poorly. The results are presented in Figure   ( Given the persistence of residual compensation, the results show that aggressive firms that were yesterday's heroes when the stock market did well can easily be today's outcasts when fortunes reverse.
Bear Stearns (BSC), Citigroup/Travelers (C/TRV), and AIG (AIG) are prime examples. In other words, there is substantial heterogeneity in financial firms in which high compensation, high risk-taking and tail performance go hand in hand. In particular, it is important to note that this link between compensation and risk-taking (as measured by beta, volatility, ABX exposure and returns) persists in both periods, even before the crisis. This suggests that the persistent effect picked up by our residual compensation measure is consistently linked to risk-taking over time.
We continue with our risk-taking analysis in Figure 2 (cont) where we also look at balance-sheet based measures by examining holdings of non-GSE-backed MBS (as a percentage of balance sheet size) and book leverage and their relationship with residual compensation. Figure 2 (cont) (j)-(k) and Table 5 Panel C report that holdings of non-GSE backed MBS are associated with residual compensation. As what is interesting when it comes to creative risk taking. As such, we will only consider price based risk measures in the remaining portion of this paper.
In Table 6 , we repeat our analysis relating risk-taking in 1995-2000 (2001-2008) to residual compensation in 1992-1994 (1998-2000) , where we successively drop different groups of financial firms in our analysis to see how our results vary across different sub-industries. We focus on the price risk measure since this is our least noisy measure of risk taking. First, we exclude the primary dealers from our analysis and find consistent results across all our measures of risk-taking. Second, because we are also concerned that the results may be driven by the insurance companies, we repeat the analysis dropping insurers. Again, the results are similar. Finally, we run our results using only banks and bank holding companies, excluding both insurers and the primary dealers. Although statistical significance is a bit more limited for individual risk-taking measures (not surprising given that we are losing 25-30% of our sample), our findings are still economically and statistically significant for the price-based risktaking measure, which aggregates information from the Market Beta, Return Volatility, and Exposure to ABX. So our results are not just due to primary dealers, though the results are stronger when primary dealers are included. This is not surprising, since these firms have more discretion to take risks (e.g., Bear Stearns and Citigroup). Moreover, in results not reported, the correlation between risk taking measures and residual compensation is primarily a compositional effect in that changes in the risk-taking measures are uncorrelated with changes in the residual compensation measure. This drives home again the point that we are dealing with permanent cross-firm differences.
Additionally, in Table 7 , we look at the different components of pay and find that both bonuses and equity compensation are correlated with risk-taking, consistent with earlier empirical literature which finds that bonuses and equity compensation motivate short-term behavior. 20 Although statistical significance in this exercise is more limited, and thus we use caution in interpreting our results, we find that, consistent with concerns about bonuses and risk-taking, a one-standard deviation increase in anecdotal evidence that high-powered bonus schemes are related to risk-taking.
C. Robustness Checks
In Table 8 , we perform a series of robustness checks of the above findings. First, we re-do our analysis by calculating residual compensation using book asset values rather than market value on the idea that asset values are more exogenous than firm size. This is reported in the first row. We report only the coefficient in front of residual compensation both for the early and late period for each of the risk-taking measures, which are given by the columns. The results are very similar to before.
One may worry that residual compensation is simply a proxy for book leverage. Our results indicating a low correlation between residual compensation and book leverage suggest this is not the case, but we present more formal analysis in the second row of Fourth, we do the same exercises for manufacturing industries as an out-of-sample check since the theory of short-termism and risk-taking should apply to non-financial industries as well. However, one might expect these effects to be stronger for finance firms where risk is a much bigger deal, except for our book-based risk score (which for manufacturing is simply book leverage). We find elements of this from the results reported in the fourth row, where relationship between residual compensation and our book-based risk-measure is statistically significant for manufacturing. Moreover, the economic significance of the price-based risk score is much lower for manufacturing compared to finance, at 0.09-SDs per 1-SD of residual compensation in the early period and 0.19-SDs in the late period (the comparable numbers for finance are 0.41 and 0.49-SDs, respectively). In particular, residual compensation has no statistical or economic explanatory power for ABX exposure among manufacturing firms, which is also a good check that our ABX exposure results are not spurious.
Fifth, we run a pooled regression version of our analysis. More specifically, rather than just running two cross-sectional regressions, an early period and a late period, we do the following exercise.
For each year in 1995-2008, we calculate our individual risk measures (Beta, Return Volatility, Exposure to ABX, Exposure to MBS, Book Leverage) at an annual frequency and use this to construct an annual price-based risk score and book-based risk score. We include the Exposure to ABX only in 2007 and 2008 when computing the price-based-risk score. We then run a pooled regression of each year's risk-taking measure on lagged residual pay, which we calculate using the previous three years worth of compensation data. The results are both statistically significant, with much larger economic magnitudes for the price-based score compared to the book-based score. One standard deviation of 21 For these results, we focus only on the subsample of firms which identify a CEO through the CEOANN variable in ExecuComp (a few firms do not identify a CEO). We take the average compensation of the remaining executives (up to four) as our measure of non-CEO executive compensation.
residual compensation is associated with 0.33-SDs of our price-based risk score in the following year 
D. Is it Short-Termism?
In Table 9 Panel A, we examine the hypothesis of short-term compensation explicitly by regressing risk-taking of firms on compensation while controlling for insider ownership on the presumption that insider ownership is a proxy for long-term incentives. If indeed compensation is capturing long-term pay incentives (as opposed to short-term pay as we suspect), then having insider ownership should mute our results and we should also expect insider ownership to predict risk-taking with the same sign as compensation. We measure insider ownership by the average percentage of shares held by the top 5 five executives in 1992-1994 and 1998-2000 in the early and late periods, respectively.
Our baseline findings on compensation remain even after controlling for insider ownership. Our point estimates on the association between residual compensation and our average price risk score are remarkably similar, and the statistical and economic significance are also of similar magnitudes. We find some evidence that insider ownership tends to mitigate risk-taking. Importantly, higher insider ownership was qualitatively associated with higher returns in both periods, reinforcing the view that compensation provided short-term incentives while insider ownership provided long-term incentives.
Although the effect is not statistically significant, in economic terms, a one-standard deviation increase 
E. Is it Mis-Governance?
In Table 9 Panel B, we ask whether our results are due to mis-governance or entrenchment. We relate our average price risk score measure with various measures of governance on the right-hand side.
The measures of governance that we examine are measures of entrenchment (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003 and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2009) , board independence (the percentage of outside directors on the board), and board size (Yermack 1996) . We consistently find that none of these standard measures of governance predict risk-taking, nor are they associated with our measure of residual compensation. Specifically, entrenchment measures do not predict risk-taking, nor, surprisingly, cumulative returns in either period. 22 The exception is that the E Index is negatively correlated with price-based risk-taking in the early period. The negative correlation, however, is puzzling, as it suggests that managers who were more entrenched (i.e., managed firms with weaker shareholder rights) are associated with less risk-taking. 
F. Is It Heterogeneous Investor Preferences?
Finally, we explore the idea derived from our quant-bubble and cowboy culture hypotheses, that risk-taking and executive compensation may be related to heterogeneous shareholder preferences.
Specifically, there is heterogeneity in investor preferences with short-termist investors (say institutional investors such as mutual funds who themselves have short horizons) who want certain firms to take more risks and hence give them short-term incentives to do so. To implement this hypothesis empirically, we use two proxies, institutional ownership as the direct measure and share turnover as an indirect measure of institutional ownership presence stocks with high institutional ownership are also high turnover stocks (Hong and Stein 2007).
22 One concern may be that the entrenchment measures may not relate linearly to risk-taking. We repeat our analysis by analyzing risk-taking among "Democracy" firms (firms with G Index less than or equal to 5) and "Dictatorship" firms (firms with G Index greater than or equal to 14) and also find no relationship with risk-taking. 23 We do, however, acknowledge that there is endogeneity in board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998).
There is significant variation in average institutional ownership. We compute the average monthly stock turnover in the 36 months of 1992-1994 (1998-2000) and then relate this to residual compensation and subsequent risk-taking in 1995-2000 (2001-2008) .
From the summary statistics for our measure of speculative activity in Table 1 (cont), there is significant heterogeneity in share turnover -the mean monthly share turnover among stocks in the 1998-2000
period was 8% with a standard deviation of 4%, ranging from 2% (the minimum) to 23% (the maximum). Even in the early period, before the height of the dot-com bubble, the standard deviation of monthly turnover was 4%, with a maximum of 19%. We next turn to share turnover, which is highly correlated with institutional ownership. Residual compensation and risk-taking are statistically and economically significantly related to stock turnover.
In particular, a one-standard deviation increase in average monthly stock turnover is associated with a concerned that we may be introducing a scale effect in using share turnover (which is a ratio of volume over shares outstanding) as a proxy for speculative activity, we add a control for market capitalization and find remarkably similar results (not reported for brevity). For example, even after controlling for size, a one-standard deviation increase in share turnover in the late period is associated with a 0.38-standard deviation increase in the price-based risk score, and is significant at the 5% level. We repeat this exercise in controlling for size in our institutional ownership regressions and also find similar results.
In results not reported here, when we run a horse race between institutional ownership and stock turnover, institutional ownership emerges as the more significant variable, though both variables retain the right sign. The only issue is that these two variables are highly correlated and so we might worry a bit about multi-collinearity in interpreting such a multiple regression. In sum, broadly, the findings in Panel A support the implication from the quant-bubble and cowboy culture story that heterogeneous investor preferences for risk-taking play a key role in the observed correlation between residual compensation and risk-taking.
These two hypotheses are similar in spirit but do differ in their predictions in subtle ways. For instance, the quant-bubble story has an implication that high residual compensation firms ought to also be high valuation firms similar to dot-com stocks. In Table 10 Panel B, we ask if it fact that high residual compensation firms are like the growth firms of finance. One way to examine this hypothesis is to see whether our compensation/risk-taking correlation is just due to growth options, proxied by a firm's market/book ratio. Under this hypothesis, market/book should be positively correlated with subsequent risk-taking. Here we present results where we include in our regressions of risk-taking and compensation a firm's market/book and market capitalization at the end of each ranking period.
Importantly, our results for residual compensation still hold. In contrast, for our average price risk measure, a firm's market/book has limited explanatory power in comparison. The proviso in this analysis is that market-to-book is typically a poor measure of finance firm valuations.
Broadly, the evidence supports a story where short-term investors incentivize management using short-term incentives to take large bets on risky propositions. This alternative does not necessarily imply that managers were fully aware of their risks. If shareholders in certain firms want their managers to take risks they will offer appropriate contracts. Managers will also select themselves into these firms.
Ceteris paribus, these firms will end up with managers that have more tolerance for risks or that do not fully perceive risks. As an example, one might think that Joseph Casano (of AIG FP) or Stanley O'Neal were ideal managers for stockholders that wanted their firms to take a lot of risk.
We also stress that we do not view this hypothesis as incompatible with the hypothesis that entrenchment is a significant problem that led to the crisis, but in light of the non-correlation between shareholder rights and both risk-taking and price performance, at a minimum our results suggests that further research should explore investor preferences as an alternative hypothesis to failures of governance. Indeed, the following quote by Michael Lewis (2004) 
V. Conclusion
It is worth restating again the lack of causal statements in this analysis. What this analysis points to is that there is important heterogeneity across firms in risk-taking (i.e. Bear Stearns, Lehman and Citigroup have always been skating on the edge and have come close to failing before the most recent events) and importantly, this is very correlated with persistent compensation practices. While not causal, our analysis suggests a beginning at least in terms of being able to quantify these issues. It also suggests that deeper research into the nature of implicit incentives, peer effects, and organizational structure might bear fruit as far as understanding risk-taking by finance firms. More specifically, we have focused on cross-firm differences in risk-taking but one implication of our analysis is the vital role of competition among finance firms and the extent to which competition led to excessive risk-taking.
Further work along these lines is likely to yield considerable insights. We report summary statistics for our measures of executive compensation, residual compensation, market capitalization, and risk-taking measures in two cross-sections, the "early" and "late" periods. Panel A reports summary statistics for average executive compensation in 1992-1994 as well as summary statistics of measures of subsequent risk-taking for those firms. Panel B reports summary statistics for the late period, where we compute residual compensation in 1998-2000 and risk-taking in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . To obtain residual executive compensation, we take residuals from a regression of log executive compensation on log market capitalization in the two periods, as described in Table 2 . We report summary statistics for our measures of insider ownership, governance, and stock turnover in our two cross-sections, the "early" and "late" periods. Panel A reports summary statistics for the early cross-section (1992) (1993) (1994) We report summary statistics for our measures of executive compensation, residual compensation, market capitalization, and risk-taking measures in two cross-sections, the "early" and "late" periods. Panel A reports summary statistics for average executive compensation in 1992-1994 as well as summary statistics of measures of subsequent risk-taking for those firms. Panel B reports summary statistics for the late period, where we compute residual compensation in 1998-2000 and risk-taking in 2001-2008 . To obtain residual executive compensation, we take residuals from a regression of log executive compensation on log market capitalization in the two periods, as described in Table 2 . We report summary statistics for our measures of insider ownership, governance, and stock turnover in our two cross-sections, the "early" and "late" periods. Panel A reports summary statistics for the early cross-section (1992) (1993) (1994) Panel A reports OLS estimates of a regression where log executive compensation is the dependent variable and log market capitalization is the independent variable. We run these regressions in two periods, the "early period" (1992-1994) and "late period" (1998-2000) , where we allow for primary dealer, banks/lenders/BHC, and insurer fixed effects, and for an insurer-specific slope. We compute executive compensation by averaging the total compensation of the top five executives for each firm-year and then averaging this over the three years within each window. We measure market capitalization on December 31 in the last year of each period. Panel B reports means and standard deviations for executive compensation by each sub-industry. Panel C reports the correlation between residual executive compensation from the early period and the late period. HC3-robust standard errors are reported below each coefficient. Robust standard errors are reported. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and *** denotes significant at 1% level. We track the within-industry quintile ranking (5=highest, 1=lowest) of residual executive compensation of firms who played prominent roles in the financial crisis. We find firms in the "late period" (1998) (1999) (2000) and track what their ranking was in the early period (1992) (1993) (1994) . Names and tickers correspond to names and tickers that applied in the late period (1998) (1999) (2000) ; we note changes in names and tickers when applicable. Residual compensation is computed by regressing executive compensation on market capitalization in each period (results reported in Table 2 ) and taking the residual.
Period
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Company
Late Period (1998) (1999) (2000) Early Period (1992) (1993) (1994) We report results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are our risk-taking measures and the independent variable is residual executive compensation. The first column reports results where we run these regressions for our early cross-section, and the second column reports results for our late cross-section. In the early cross-section, residual compensation is computed in 1992-1994 and our risk-taking measures are computed in 1995m1-2000m12. For the late cross-section, residual compensation is computed in 1998-2000 and our risk-taking measures are computed in 2001m1-2008m12, with the exception of Exposure to ABX, which is computed from 19Jan06-31Dec08. Panel A contains regressions for our price-based risk measures. The CRSP VW Beta is the beta of firm returns with returns to the CRSP value-weighted market return (including dividends), computed from daily data. Return volatility is the volatility of daily returns over the risk-free rate annualized to one trading year (252 days). Exposure to ABX is the coefficient from a regression of returns over the risk-free rate on returns to the ABX AAA tranche, controlling for the excess market return, computed using daily return data. The price-based risk-score is an equal-weighted average of the z-scores of the above three measures. Panel B contains regressions for return outcomes. Cumulative excess returns are the buy-and-hold returns in excess of the market over that period. Panel C contains regressions for our book-based risk measures. Exposure to MBS is defined as total holdings of mortgage-backed securities not issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored entities divided by total balance sheet size. Book leverage is total book assets divided by the book value of stockholder's equity. The book-based risk-score is an equal-weighted average of the z-scores of the above two measures. HC3 robust standard errors are reported in brackets and R-squareds are reported in parentheses. For all standard errors and hypothesis tests, we apply a degree-of-freedom adjustment to account for sampling error in estimating residual executive compensation. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and *** denotes significant at 1% level. We regress our price-based risk-score on residual compensation for various sub-industries. The dependent variables are our price-based risk-score and cumulative excess returns defined in Table 5 , and the independent variable is residual executive compensation, defined in Table 2 . We report results from six separate regressions: the early and early and late period cross-sections for each of the three groupings. The first row within each risk-taking measure reports results excluding the primary dealers from the sample, and the second row excludes the insurers. The third row within each risk-taking measure only includes banks and bank-holding companies, which are not primary dealers in the sample. The two columns represent the results of running these exercises in the early and late period cross-sections separately. HC3 robust standard errors are reported in brackets below each coefficient. For all standard errors and hypothesis tests, we apply a degree-of-freedom adjustment to account for sampling error in estimating residual executive compensation. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and *** denotes significant at 1% level. We report results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are our risk-taking measures, defined in Table 5 . For each risk-taking measure, we run a single regression where the independent variables are residual bonus, salary, and non-cash compensation. The first column reports results where we run these regressions for our early cross-section, and the second column reports results for our late cross-section. We compute residual bonus, salary, and non-compensation similar to how we compute residual compensation. For example, we measure bonus payouts by computing average bonus payouts to the top 5 executives for each firm-year and then average this over the three years within each window (1992) (1993) (1994) for the early period, 1998-2000 for the late period). We then regress this on log market capitalization at the end of each period and take the residual. In all regressions, we include an indicator for whether or not a firm paid a bonus that year (coefficient not reported). HC3 robust standard errors are reported in brackets below each coefficient. For each regression, we apply a degree of freedom adjustment to correct for sampling error. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and *** denotes significant at 1% level. We regress our risk-taking measures on residual compensation under various robustness assumptions. Each row is a different robustness exercise and each column reports the results from an OLS regression with a different risk-taking measure as the dependent variable and residual compensation as the independent variable. In the first row, we use residual compensation computed from book asset values instead of market capitalization as the independent variable. The second row adds controls for leverage and market capitalization as independent variables in addition to residual compensation. The third row uses residual non-CEO executive compensation as the independent variable, obtained by regressing non-CEO executive compensation (top 5 excluding CEO) on market capitalization in each period and taking the residual. The fourth row repeats our exercise by using a sample of manufacturing firms (two-digit SIC 20-39) where we compute residual compensation along two-digit SIC codes. For manufacturing, the book-based risk score is simply the z-score for leverage, since holdings of MBS do not apply for these firms. In the fifth row, we check whether our results are sensitive to the cutoff period by first calculating each risk-taking measure (except for long-horizon returns) using only one year's worth of daily data. Then we run a pooled regression of each year's risk-taking measure on lagged residual compensation. Prior to 2006, we omit Exposure to ABX when computing the price-based risk score since it is not available. HC3 robust standard errors are reported in brackets under each coefficient except for the last row, where we cluster standard errors by firm. For all standard errors and hypothesis tests, we apply a degree-of-freedom adjustment to account for sampling error in estimating residual executive compensation. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and *** denotes significant at 1% level. In Panel A, we run OLS regressions of our risk-taking measures on residual compensation (defined in Table 2 ), controlling for insider ownership. The dependent variables are defined in Table 5 . We measure insider ownership as the average percentage of shares plus delta-weighted options owned by the top 5 executives during each period. Delta-weights are computed using the Core and Guay (1999) methodology. In Panel B, run OLS regressions of our risk-taking measures and residual compensation on governance measures. For each dependent variable, we report four rows of results corresponding to separate regressions using four different governance measures as independent variables. G-Index is the Gompers-IshiiMetrick (2003) measure of managerial entrenchment. E-Index is the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2008) measure of entrenchment. % Outside Directors is the percentage of outside directors who have no significant connection with the firm (classified as "Independent" by RiskMetrics). Board Size is the total number of directors in the firm. In both panels, each column represents the results of these regressions separately for our early and late cross-sections. Coefficients are reported with HC3 robust standard errors in brackets. For the specification with residual compensation as the dependent variable, we apply a degree of freedom adjustment to account for sampling error. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and *** denotes significant at 1% level. In Panel A, we regress our risk-taking measures and residual compensation on institutional ownership and stock turnover The dependent variables are our risk-taking measures (defined in Table 5 ) and residual compensation (defined in Table 2 ). The independent variable in the first two columns is institutional ownership, where the first column is a regression for the early period and the second column for the late period. The independent variable in the third and fourth column is stock turnover in the early and late period, respectively. Institutional ownership is defined as the total shares held by institutions reporting in 13F statements divided by the number of shares outstanding averaged over the 12 quarters in 1992-1994 for the early period and 1998-2000 for the late period. Stock turnover is defined as the monthly volume divided by shares outstanding averaged over the 36 months in the early and late periods. In Panel B we run our risk-taking regressions where the dependent variable are our risk measures and outcomes and the independent variables are residual compensation with controls for market capitalization and market/book. HC3-robust standard errors are reported in brackets below each coefficient and R-squareds are reported in parentheses. For the specification with residual executive compensation as a dependent variable, we apply a degrees-of-freedom adjustment to account for sampling error. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and *** denotes significant at 1% level. The figure plots the log of average executive compensation on the vertical axis against log market capitalization on the horizontal axis, and overlays a linear fit. Panel A plots this relationship for the early period (1992) (1993) (1994) and Panel B plots this relationship for the late period (1998) (1999) (2000) . Slopes and intercepts are calculated using a model where all three groups (primary dealers, banks, insurers) have their own intercepts and insurers have a distinct slope from banks and primary dealers. Tickers significant to the crisis are labeled.
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Figure 2: Residual Executive Compensation and Risk-Taking
We plot our measures of risk-taking on the vertical axis of each panel against residual compensation on the horizontal axis for both the early and late cross-sections. Panels A and B plot the relationship of a firm's stock return beta with residual executive compensation. Panels C and D plot the relationship for daily return volatility (annualized using 252 trading days), and Panel E plots ABX Exposure and residual compensation. A linear fit is overlaid and we report the slopes, tstatistics, p-values, and R-squares associated with each fit. The t-statistics are calculated using HC3-robust standard errors with a degrees-of-freedom adjustment to account for sampling error in estimating residual executive compensation. Tickers significant to the crisis are labeled.
Figure 2 (Continued): Residual Executive Compensation and Risk-Taking
We plot our measures of risk-taking on the vertical axis of each panel against residual compensation on the horizontal axis for both the early and late cross-sections. Panels F and G plot a price-based risk-score based on beta, volatility, and ABX exposure against residual compensation. Panels H and I plot a firm's cumulative excess return over the market in each period. Panels J and K plot the relationship for average non-GSE MBS holdings as a percentage of total balance sheet size for both periods. A linear fit is overlaid and we report the slopes, t-statistics, p-values, and R-squares associated with each fit. The t-statistics are calculated using HC3-robust standard errors with a degrees-of-freedom adjustment to account for sampling error in estimating residual executive compensation. Tickers significant to the crisis are labeled.
